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ABSTRACT  
Preserving security and confidentiality in wireless sensor networks (WSN) are crucial. Wireless sensor 
networks in comparison with wired networks are more substantially vulnerable to attacks and intrusions. 
In WSN, a third person can eavesdrop to the information or link to the network. So, preventing these 
intrusions by detecting them has become one of the most demanding challenges. This paper, proposes an 
improved watchdog technique as an effective technique for detecting malicious nodes based on a power 
aware hierarchical model. This technique overcomes the common problems in the original Watchdog 
mechanism. The main purpose to present this model is reducing the power consumption as a key factor 
for increasing the network's lifetime. For this reason, we simulated our model with Tiny-OS simulator 
and then, compared our results with non hierarchical model to ensure the improvement. The results 
indicate that, our proposed model is better in performance than the original models and it has increased 
the lifetime of the wireless sensor nodes by around 2611.492 seconds for a network with 100 sensors. 
KEYWORDS 
WSN, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Watchdog, Improved Watchdog, Low-Power, Hierarchical 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent progresses in electronics and wireless telecommunication allow us to design and 
develop sensors with low consumptive power, small size, and reasonable price for various 
applications. These small sensors are able to receive different environmental information (based 
on the sensor type), process and transmit them.  
Intruding into a network refers to any activity which endangers the integrity, confidentiality and 
accessibility of a source and an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a system which detects 
Intrusion activities [1]. The main idea of developing IDS came from examining the behavior 
patterns of ordinary users and identifying the abnormal behavior patterns of the users. Intrusion 
detection system which operates statistically demonstrates the network traffic like radar and 
detects any signal which may indicate an abnormal event or attack to the network [2].  
Establishing security in wireless sensor networks due to its changing nature and non-
concentrated typology has increased the vulnerability in these networks. Moreover, as a result of 
energy limitations in wireless sensors, the consumptive power has always been a challenging 
issue to be considered in designing these wireless sensor networks. In spite of the high volume 
of researches and studies which tried to propose an efficient intrusion detection system, none of 
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them managed to develop a system which is able to identify and drive away all attacks to 
wireless sensor networks. Since, these researches have focused on specific kinds of attacks. 
In this paper we, we propose an approach for implementing a new intrusion detection system to 
increase the network's lifetime and security level. The proposed algorithm solved the following 
known problems: impartial removal, selecting the incorrect malicious node, limited power 
transfer, and node conspiracy. 
This paper organized in the following manner: Section 2 provides related works of intrusion 
detection in WSNs. Section 3, provides existing vulnerabilities of WSNs. The proposed 
algorithm and also the hierarchical model are also discussed in section 4. After that, the Tiny-
OS simulation will be explained in Section 5. Experimental results are given in section 6. 
Section 7 concludes the paper and at the end, the future works will be discussed in section 8. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
So far, different techniques have been proposed for intrusion detection in wireless sensor 
networks. In the following sections some of them are discussed. 
In [3] and [4] a technique has been proposed for identity authentication in intrusion detection in 
wireless sensor networks in an interleaved manner which is called Interleaved Hop-By-Hop 
authentication (IHOP in brief).  IHOP guarantees to indentify all the incorrect packets injected 
into the network.  In [3], the wireless sensors networks are organized hierarchically in clusters. 
The cluster in upper level creates a route for connection to base station and each interface node 
has a node connected to its upper level and also a node connected to its lower level. In IHOP an 
upper cluster collects the information related to identity authentication from its members 
(subordinates) and sends it to the base station in form of a report. This reporting occurs only 
when at least 1+t sensor observes similar results (this paper does not show how the t parameter 
should be adjusted to sensor network). However, IHOP guarantees that the base station will 
identify incorrect packets (when more than t nodes did not agree to cooperate).   
Another technique [5] proposed route filtering using statistical techniques which can identify 
and delete incorrect data. In this technique, there is a key extensive pool and each sensor is 
allocated a part of this pool. Whenever a move in the region begins, the sensors identify this 
move and one of the nodes as the base station checks all the network addresses and filters all the 
reports en route conveying the address incorrectness. However, as mentioned in [4], this 
technique is used for protecting the network against incorrect information injection and cannot 
drive away the attacks such as selective forwarding attacks.  
Also, another approach [6] was proposed based on a routing called INSESN (Intrusion-Tolerant 
Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks) in which the sensors collect the information related to 
regional typology and send it to the base station. Afterwards, the base station creates the routing 
table according to the collected information and sends it to the related sensors. The base station 
is the main control node for creating the routing table which reduces the nodes computational 
load. Although INSENS has been developed by a protocol based on routing table, these are the 
base stations which collect all the information and create the routing table for each sensor. 
However, INSENS is not suitable for large sensor networks.  
During the recent years, intrusion detection based on the statistical techniques has been widely 
under the spotlight. For example, [7] uses data analysis techniques (such as clustering and 
neural networks [18]) using the data available in the user's reports and has examined and 
predicted their behavioral algorithm and tried to optimize the efficiency of intrusion detection in 
the system by separating the abnormal algorithms from the normal ones using various 
presuppositions and the intelligent technology.  
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3. SECURITY THREATS 
The vulnerabilities in network cause attack occurrence. If we succeed to minimize them in a 
network, we can contribute to enhancing the security in the network. In fact, the vulnerabilities 
are the only controllable parts in wireless sensor networks. As a result of these natural 
limitations in WSNs, Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks which can cause damage to sensor 
networks by consuming the energy and the available sources [8] are the main power 
consumption attacks. Table 1 summarizes DOS attacks and the vulnerable areas which cause 
attack occurrence in WSN.  
Table 1. DOS Threats and Attacks in WSN 
Description Attacks 
Jamming attack occurs as a result of intentional interference in the 
radio waves in order to prevent a node from using radio channel [8].  
Jamming attack 
Most of the professional attackers are able to intrude into the nodes 
memory and get access to the information inside or the encoding keys 
and Also, they can replace the programs with the malicious ones [9].  
Tampering attack 
In these attacks, the attacker identifies wireless exchanges around the 
victim node and creates Collision and destroys the key packets [8].   
Collision  attack 
An attacker can create DOS attacks by inserting the nodes to his 
message re-sending [8].   
Interrogation and 
Exhaustion attack 
In wireless sensor networks, all nodes can participate in routing 
operation to find the best route for sending the message. Only one 
node may not deny sending the packet and advertizing a specific route 
for its neighbors and it may create black holes in routing [10 & 11]   
Selective forwarding 
attacks 
An attacker can misdirect the network nodes by sending the messages 
to wrong routes [17].  
wrong-routing attacks 
(misdirecting attack) 
The attacker advertises wrong routing information [17].  Sinkhole attacks 
In a wormhole attack, an attacker captures the packets at one point in 
the network and tunnels them to another point (at a distant location), 
and then replays them there into the network from that point [20].  
Wormhole attacks 
Most of the used protocols assume a unique ID. However in Sybil 
attacks, the attacker node has several IDs [12].  
Sybil attacks 
Flooding attack covers and uses the victim's limited sources such as 
memory, processing cycle and band width [8]. 
Flooding Attack 
Since many protocols creates neighboring tables though exchanging 
Hello messages, these attacks cause various disorders in the system 
such as increasing the traffic in radio channels and decreasing the 
nodes operational power [13].  
Hello Message 
Flooding 
4. POWER-AWARE INTRUSION DETECTION IN WSNS 
Power in the examined wireless sensor network can be obtained through computational 
techniques. Moreover, power as a desirable feature can prolong the life of sensor nodes and 
network [14]. Generally, the largest portion of the sensors power in wireless sensor network is 
consumed in receiving and transmitting the information at the RF module. Therefore, in this 
research, the main focus is on energy consumption in the functional areas of the wireless sensor 
network (such as the nodes containing IDS). Pt(d), is the minimum power consumption for 
sending 1 bit of information at Euclidean distance d  and Pr  is the minimum power consumed 
for receiving 1 bit which can by calculated by [14]: 
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Where a1 the parameter related to sender circuit , equals 50 nj/bit , a2 parameter related to sender 
booster, equals 100 Pj/bit/m2, d stands for the distance between the functional node i and the 
target functional node, and n  refers to the parameter related to the local emission reduction 
which equals 2. B refers to the parameters related to receiver circuit which is 50 nj/bit. Power 
consumption in a single node in time unit is calculated according to the equation 3 [14].  
sgirirriit PrrPre ).(. ++=
                                                          (3) 
Where rri refers to input information bit rate to the functional node i. rgi refers to the produced 
information bit rate in the functional node I and Ps is minimum power consumed for sending 
information which is equal with Pt(d). With regard to the fact that raw information bit rate in 
wireless sensor network is considerably low compared to the other common wireless networks, 
the high quality of the information and fast transfer is not of high importance. The average 
speed of raw information production is about 512 bps which is evidently very low in some 
applications. The life period of each functional node i equals to primary energy ratio to energy 
consumption in time unit.  This is shown in the equation (4) [14]:  
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Where ei   refers to the primary energy of the functional node i which is calculated according to: 
tIRei ..
2
=
                                                                       (5)  
According to [24], R stands for resistance which considered 1 ohm and I, is 8 mA for an active 
node, and t is the node's boot time. 
4.1. Proposed Modified Watchdog Technique 
Watchdog technique is one of the malicious nodes identification techniques which operates 
based on broadcast property in wireless sensor networks. The node like node A which intends to 
sends a packet to node C, can eavesdrop the sent traffic of the node B and determine whether or 
not the node B will send the packet to C (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Conventional Watchdog mechanism 
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Here we try to propose a new technique based on Watchdog mechanism which is modified and 
improved by enhancing the security in wireless sensor network. We call this technique I-
Watchdog (Improved Watchdog). Unlike the basic technique in which the node A is assumed to 
be the watchdog, in I-Watchdog technique, as shown in Figure 2, the cluster heads (nodes that 
are responsible for monitoring each cell) are assumed to be as the first layer watchdogs.  
 
Figure 2. Proposed Improved-Watchdog (I-Watchdog)   
In the proposed approach, if a node for example A wants to send a message to a node say C, the 
cluster head node (M) operates as watchdog. As shown in Figure 2, the cluster head node uses a 
buffer which accommodates all the sent items by the nodes within its sensory limit. Since the 
node B is an interface between A and C, it eavesdrops the first sending of the node B after 
receiving the message from A and compares it with the message in the buffer. If the messages 
are similar, the first message in the buffer will be deleted. Otherwise, it will turn out that the 
node B has not sent the message or replaced it with another one. We assume that the buffer used 
by Watchdog in this technique, as the Figure 2 show, has been divided into cells like b0, b1, b2, 
…, bi, …and bn. According to malicious node detection algorithm which will be discussed 
below, and using the equation 6 value, we can determine whether or not the message sent from 
A to B will be correctly sent to C (the target node).  
Here, PBC  refers to the packet to be sent to C by B.  
                                                 (6)   BCii PbF −=              ∀  ni ≤≤0  
4.1.1. The Proposed Algorithm for Malicious Node Detection 
The steps of the algorithm for malicious node detection are as follow:  
1- A sends a packet to C via B. Meanwhile, M (the cluster head node) eavesdrops the 
packet and saves a copy in its counterpart section in buffer b.  
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2- The node M eavesdrops to the communication between B and C for t second (this time 
depends on the nodes processing and sending speed as well as the sensors type) and 
refers to the step 5 in the case of not receiving any packet.  
3- The Fi value is calculated if M eavesdrops to the packet PBC.  
4- If Fi=0, the message in cell bi (where its counterpart message has been saved in buffer b) 
will be deleted and the algorithm moves to the step 6. If Fi ≠ 0, the message remains in 
the buffer and moves to step 5.  
5- The warning message, signaling the maliciousness of the node B, is sent to the upper 
layer by the cluster head node.   
6- The end of algorithm. 
As mentioned earlier, in the case of entering the step 5, the cluster head node sends a warning 
message to the upper layer. If the warnings reach a specific limit, the cluster head node 
introduces B and a malicious node. The flowchart of the conducted operation for intrusion 
detection has been illustrated in Figure 3 in order to facilitate understanding the proposed 
technique.  In this flowchart, i is the buffer counter, PA is the packet sent by the node A, PBC is 
the sent packet from B to C, t is the maximum waiting time, F is the comparison function and 
b(i) is the content of cell i in buffer M.  
  
Figure 3. The Proposed flowchart for intrusion detection in WSNs 
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4.2. Error ratio 
We can calculate the error ratio for selective forwarding attacks using the following equation, 
which has been mentioned in [15]: 
(7)                                    255
__
_
_ ∗
+
=
countergoodcounerbad
counerbad
ratioError      
Where bad_counter is a number of packets that weren’t forwarded and good_counter is a 
number of packets that were forwarded. The error ratio will help us to estimate mean error rate, 
so we can compare the proposed Technique with the original one. 
4.3. Hierarchical Design Based on Intrusion Detection System 
In this section, a model is proposed for saving the power consumed by the nodes while 
implementing an intrusion detection system in wireless sensor networks. This model follows a 
hierarchical architecture. The whole system is divided into smaller parts (called cells). Figure 4 
shows the different layers categorization. Each cell indicates the sensory limit of a cluster head 
node. The cluster head nodes marked in blue are in charge of supervising the cells. According to 
this division, the red nodes are the regional nodes which as you can see should be selected in a 
way to be located on the cells boundaries to enable their sensory limit to cover a number of 
nodes of the cluster head. 
It is important to be mentioned that, unlike the similar models such as [17], the proposed model 
does not necessarily require arranging the sensors in the system in order. The number of the 
sensors in the cells can be different. The system topology can be changing. The only fixed 
nodes in the network are the regional and cluster head nodes which should be selected at the 
outset of designing the network by the base station.  
 
Figure 4. The modified hierarchical model and categorization of the entities  
In the proposed model two intrusion detection mechanisms i.e. “signature-based detection” and 
“anomaly detection” can be incorporated. The normal attacks signatures can be compiled in the 
base station to be sent to the regional and cluster head nodes in order to detect these signatures. 
The date base is able to be updated to detect new attacks (detection based on the attacks 
signatures). In addition, using the techniques of detecting abnormality in the first level by the 
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cluster head nodes, we can detect the attacks and hence create high security for the sensor 
network. The intrusion detection entities in the target architecture include: 
Cluster head node: As mentioned earlier, this node is responsible for monitoring the related 
region. These nodes eavesdrop to the data sent by the nodes under their control, analyze the data 
and inform their upper nodes (regional nodes) of the suspicious cases. In fact, compared to the 
other sensors, these nodes enjoy more capacities including the intrusion detection program 
installed on them.  
Regional node: These nodes are in charge of controlling and receiving the information from 
their neighboring cluster head nodes as well as sending warning message to the upper layer 
which is the base station. These nodes have all the abilities of the intrusion detection system. In 
addition, they allow integration into larger networks.  Therefore, even in presence of a large 
number of sensors, the network can be divided into smaller section to be easily manageable.   
Base station: Base station is the top level of the proposed model which is directly supported by 
human force. This station receives the information from the regional nodes, analyzes them and 
applies the necessary operations and policies to the system.  
In the cases that message is sent to out of the cells limit, the monitoring is assigned to the upper 
layer. In this case, the regional nodes operate as Watchdog. If the regional nodes are malicious 
themselves, the upper layer i.e. the base station should detect the malicious nodes by monitoring 
the regional nodes and applying security measures. Thus, in this case the top level of watchdog 
is the base station. Figure 5 shows the different levels of watchdog in the network.  
 
Figure 5. The Watchdog nodes in the proposed model 
5. TINY-OS SIMULATION 
In this paper Tiny-OS environment in Linux has been used for the simulations. TOSSIM is a 
Tiny-OS mote simulator which is useful for testing both the algorithms and implementations; 
however it does not simulate the physical phenomena that are sensed [19]. Tiny-OS is perhaps 
the first operating system specifically designed for wireless sensor networks [21]. Instead of 
compiling one of the Tiny-OS programs in each component of wireless sensor network, the 
users can use TOSSIM which can be run in PCs. Furthermore, it should be taken into the 
account that TOSSIM primarily aims at providing a simple and high-level simulation for Tiny-
OS programs. 
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Simulating sensor network have been conducted assuming 100 sensor nodes. Figure 6 indicates 
the lifetimes of the nodes which have different ranges in our simulated network. As shown in 
Figure 7, there are up to 40% of nodes which can live more than 60000 seconds, 21% of 
lifetimes are between 40000 to 60000 seconds and 30% of them are between 20000 to 40000 
seconds. 
 
Figure 6. Nodes lifetime 
 
Figure 7. Share of nodes lifetime pie chart 
Figure 8 shows the diagram of energy consumption variations by increasing the nodes distance 
(average radio signal). As you can see, the simulated network follows the theoretical pattern 
which implies that "the more the distance, the more the power consumption" and shows a 
similar behavior. 
So, increasing the distance between nodes and the base station increases the consumed energy 
for sending and receiving the information and hence declines the node energy and remaining 
power. However, it is to be mentioned that other factors are also influential on nodes energy 
reduction such as primary energy of the nodes, the nodes sleeping cycle and the used intrusion 
detection system.  
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Figure 8. Diagram of nodes energy consumption variations by increasing the distance 
With regard to the table 2, the proposed information can be interpreted as follows: the node 43 
located in a 54 m distance from the base station has been booted with 58.53087 (Joule) primary 
energy and  averagely (in active mode) consumes 0.00375 (Joule) energy per second and lives 
in the network for  156082.3 (seconds). Similarly, the node 83 located in a 79 m distance from 
the base station has been booted with 0.070435 (Joule) primary energy and averagely (in active 
mode) consumes 0.000716 (Joule) energy and will live in the system for 98.37274 (seconds).  
Table 2. Minimum/ maximum power of the nodes 
5.1. Cluster Head Selection 
Cluster head nodes are selected according to their life period. Since we assume three-layer 
architecture, first we should select the high-level cluster head nodes then the low-level cluster 
head nodes. Since each cluster head node is in charge of monitoring the cell in two layers, we 
assume the number of the cluster head nodes in the second layer to be equal to the number of 
the cells. The number of the cells in a hierarchical network depends on several factors such as 
the number of the nodes, the area of the geographical environment and the sensors applications 
[22]. Since the number of the sensors is specified in the conducted simulation, this number is 
taken as the criteria for partitioning the system into cells. It is to be mentioned that, this layering 
can be different in other networks.  
The simulation has been conducted for 100 sensor nodes. We assumed that if the maximum 
number of the possible nodes per cell is 5, then 20 cells can be put into the first layer. Similarly, 
if the maximum number of the possible nodes in the cells of the second layer is 4, then 5 cells 
Node's 
Number 
Primary energy 
of the node  
 ei (J) 
The energy consumed by 
the node i  in time unit 
eit (J/s)  
The lifetime of 
the node  i 
Li (s)  
Distance 
 
d (m) 
43 58.53087 0.000375 156082.3 54 
73 0.070435 0.000716 98.37274 79 
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can be put into the second layer. Therefore, the number of cluster head nodes is 25 (20 nodes in 
the first layer and 5 nodes in the second layer). Figure 9 shows this layering.  
 
Figure 9. The layering of the wireless sensor network (assuming 100 sensor nodes) 
As mentioned earlier, the cluster head nodes are responsible for collecting the information 
related to their cells and sending the information to the upper layer. In the hierarchical design, if 
the energy of some nodes (in a particular cell) got finished, the cluster head node can have 
access to the information through other sensors available in that cell. However, when the energy 
of the cluster head node ends, the base station's access to the cell's information will be lost, even 
if other sensors have energy in that cell.  
Threshold lifetime: The cluster head node life should not be less than a specific time. We call 
it, threshold lifetime. This duration is different for each cluster head node due to the lower level 
nodes. It equals to the longest life period among the low-level sensors of a cluster head node.  
5.2. Implementing IDSs 
Implementing intrusion detection program on the designed wireless sensor networks requires 
measuring the energy consumed by the cluster head nodes for installing intrusion detection 
program on them. The cluster head node life duration should not be less than the low level 
nodes lifetime. Therefore, this power consumed for intrusion detection program should be 
considerably low so that the cluster head node life stays at the threshold life period level.  
As mentioned before, in the proposed model, the intrusion detection programs can be only 
implemented on cluster head nodes or each cell representative. Therefore, the power consumed 
by the intrusion detection program should be also taken into the account in implementation 
process. Because some of the primary energy of the cluster head node i is consumed for 
implementing the intrusion detection system while booting. According to energy survival law 
[23], the primary energy of the cluster head node i, by implementing the intrusion detection 
program once, can be calculated by below: 
piip eee −=
                                                                   (8) 
Where ep is the power consumed to run the intrusion detection program on each node and ei is 
the primary energy of node i. 
The wireless sensors network with consideration of the program's influence on cluster and 
regional nodes are shown in Figure 10. In this implementation, the location of the sensors is 
selected based on the distance from the base station. 
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Figure 10. A view of our simulation setup with 100 nodes 
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6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In the first part of our experiments, we tried to set various sensing radius (-60 dB, -75 dB and -
78 dB). The results of this test are shown on Figure 11. It is clear that when we limit monitoring 
only to nodes with stronger signal, mean error ratio is lower. 
As can be seen in Figure 11, the improved Watchdog technique has less error than the original 
Watchdog technique and it seems to be more efficient. In addition, the highest mean error rates 
are within the -78 dB which is about 23 for I-Watchdog and 111 for Watchdog. According to 
our results, it appears that among these signals, the -60 dB is more appropriate. 
 
Figure 11. Dependence of error ratio on sensing radius 
 
Table 3 shows the comparison between Watchdog and I-Watchdog techniques. As you can see, 
four problems of Watchdog techniques have been resolved in the proposed I-Watchdog 
technique.  
Table 3. The comparison of I-Watchdog with Watchdog 
I-Watchdog  Watchdog Problems 
Yes   Yes Creating ambiguous Collision  
Yes   Yes Creating Collision in the receiver 
No   Yes Selecting the incorrect malicious node 
No Yes Limited power transfer 
No  Yes  Node conspiracy  
No Yes Impartial removal  
 
To comparing the network life period in the two model and normalize the nodes, we assume that 
the intrusion detection program has been already installed and implemented on all the nodes.  
In the second part of our experiment, we proposed a hierarchical model; the intrusion detection 
program can be implemented only on the cluster head nodes (not on the other nodes). However, 
in the normal model, it can be implemented on all nodes and each node conducts the intrusion 
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detection operation separately. Each node operates as a cluster head node. Figure 12 shows 
nodes life period difference in the proposed and the normal model.  
 
 
Figure 12. Nodes life period differences between the proposed and the conventional model 
As seen in Figure 12, the biggest life period difference belongs to the node 19. It means, this 
node (in the proposed model) lives 55.24903 seconds more than its counterpart node (in the 
normal model). Similarly, the other nodes are also indicated. According to Figure 12, it can be 
concluded that the proposed model has increased the sensor nodes lifetime approximately by 
2611.492 seconds.  
However, it is to be mentioned that in some of the nodes (e.g. node 3), life duration has not 
changed. Thus, in the proposed model, less energy is consumed for implementing the intrusion 
detection program. As a whole, in this model, 1744.488 mJ less energy was consumed 
compared to the normal model. This energy value is considerable for some wireless sensor 
network applications. 
Finally, we simulated three Networks which were included 50, 100 & 200 nodes. After 
implementation of the proposed model, we have calculated the lifetimes of nodes, the overall 
network lifetimes with implementing the proposed model in compare to the normal model have 
been shown in Figure 13. As a result, there has been a rapid growth in the lifetime when the 
number of nodes increases.   
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Figure 13. The overall network lifetimes by increasing the number of nodes 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we tried to prolong the sensor nodes lifetime by proposing a new hierarchical 
architecture and an improved version of Watchdog technique and implementing it. Also, we 
aimed at proposing an effective intrusion detection system in wireless sensor networks. The 
proposed model does not necessarily require arranging the sensors in the system in order and the 
number of the sensors in the cells can be changing.  The system topology can also change. The 
only fixed nodes in the system are the regional and cluster head nodes which should be selected 
by the base station at the outset of network design. To confirm the optimization of this model 
compared to the normal sensor network model, the implementation has been conducted on a 
sensor network simulated in Tiny-OS. The results indicate that the proposed model is efficient 
in terms of energy consumption and sensor nodes life duration. In addition, the conclusions 
pertaining to the hierarchical model are as follow: 
1- Network design based on layering technique enables the other sensors in a cell to cover 
the related region if the energy of one or more sensors ends. As a result, the sensor 
network operation will continue without encountering any problem.  
2- Hierarchical design increases the network security. Because, if there is a malicious node 
in each layer, both the upper layer and the nodes in the same layer will detect it. 
Therefore, here the node maliciousness can be detected in two ways. Moreover, since the 
regional nodes are directly monitored by base station, they are not likely to be intruded.  
3- Monitoring the layered networks is much more convenient. Because in the layered 
networks only the last layer nodes are monitored and the other nodes are managed by 
this layer. However, in the other networks, we are generally forced to be in touch with a 
wider range of nodes.   
8. FUTURE WORK 
Wireless sensor networks needs an intrusion detection system which operates regionally 
distributed. This system should be economical in terms of communications, energy and 
memory. So far, many studies have been carried out on establishing and preserving security and 
intrusion detection in wireless networks (such as wireless sensor networks). The salient research 
areas can be categorized as follows: 
Principles: studies on intrusion, intruders and security threats. 
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Information collection: selecting the data sources and their features, how to collect the data, 
the staffs` entering and exit, system data format and template. 
Intrusion detection techniques: finding best techniques for detecting intrusions, optimizing the 
intrusion detection efficiency. 
Reporting and reaction:  how inform the person or the network representative of the intrusion 
detection, how to react against attacks. 
Architecture of the intrusion detection system environment: how distribute the intrusion 
detection agents in the environment and establish relation and interaction between them, also the 
issues related to IDS implementation on different systems and encoded networks. 
IDS security: protecting IDSs and their traffic. 
Testing and evaluation: how to test IDS and evaluate its performance. 
Operational aspects: IDS maintenance, enhancement and transport.  
Social aspects:  issues related to preserving the user's privacy. 
Most of the studies mentioned above have been reached an acceptable step.  Most of them have 
been conducted on intrusion detection techniques.   
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